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N e w s l e t t e r 1
Now, more than ever, with Islamic voices
contesting politics, culture and society in prac-
tically every country with a Muslim population,
Islam would appear to have a unity and a com-
mon purpose across political and cultural fron-
tiers: to provide a common identity for Mus-
lims who wish to live in a society of their faith
and be ruled by their sacred law. This picture
can only confirm in the public mind the idea of
Islam as a common essence of all these soci-
eties, one that rules and determines their cul-
ture and their social and political processes. 
The views asserting the uniqueness, unity
and exceptionalism of Muslim society and his-
tory are all the more potent in the current
intellectual climate which has seen the demise
of universalist theories of historical causation
and social analysis such as Marxism. The idea
of cultural and civilizational essences and iden-
tities underlying unique histories of particular
civilizations have been most prominently stat-
ed in Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civiliza-
tions’ thesis. Even though this has been widely
criticized, the assumptions behind it are equal-
ly widely held, not least by many Muslim and
Arab intellectuals.
Muslim exceptionalism and uniqueness and
the centrality of religion to Muslim society and
history are, of course, the pillars of Islamist
political advocacy. Many ‘secular’ intellectuals,
specially in Egypt, while challenging Islamist
illiberal interpretations, would, nevertheless,
wish to base their own advocacies on ‘authen-
tic’ Muslim and Arab ‘culture’. Many advocates
of Human Rights, for instance, insist on deriv-
ing these rights from liberal (and strained)
interpretations of the Qu'ran and the tradi-
tions. I have encountered strong hostility to
my argument that the modern discourses of
Human Rights are products of recent political
struggles and ideologies, many of them
against the establishments of state, church
and dominant classes, and which have no
ancestry in the much older ethical and legal
discourses of any religion.
What is unique about Islam? I argue, along-
side many colleagues, against this cultural
essentialization of an exceptional ‘Islamic
world’, contrasted implicitly or explicitly with
an equally exceptional and totalized ‘West’. Of
course, every history is unique. The conceptual
tools of social and historical analyses are how-
ever common, and are used to analyse diverse
unique histories. The question also arises of
what is the object whose unique history is
being told? Does ‘Islamic society’ constitute a
unitary entity with a common and consistent
history extending to the present and underly-
ing the current ‘Islamic phenomenon’? Many
eminent writers such as the historian H.A.R.
Gibb and the anthropologist and philosopher
Ernest Gellner, have advanced arguments to
that effect. These arguments are the products
of deep scholarship and often thorough famili-
arity with the histories and cultures of the
region. The question however is conceptual:
the essentialism rests on a totalization of histo-
ries and societies as ‘Islamic’. This label cannot
be denied: yet, what commonality does it
entail? It can be argued for instance, that the
modern history (from the eighteenth century)
of Iran shows a totally different political and
social structure to that of Turkey or Egypt, let
alone Arabia. It can be plausibly argued that
the Christian and Muslim shores of the
Mediterranean shared many common features
of popular culture: Tunisian coastal cities had
more in common with Sicily and the Italian
south than with Arabia or Iraq. The manifest
reality, for instance, of women in southern
Europe covering their heads in a similar man-
ner to their Mediterranean Muslim counter-
parts seems to have escaped the notice of
observers intent on totalized contrasts!
Indeed, we can date the divergence from pre-
vious common elements between the two
shores of the Mediterranean to the second half
of the twentieth century as many Muslim
Mediterranean cities, such as Alexandria or
Algiers, became ‘peasantized’ by the great
rural influx, and European Mediterranean cities
increasingly integrated into a national culture
dominated by the North, a process accelerated
by the regional policies of the European Com-
m u n i t y .
I still have to deal with the question of what
it is that lends credence to the essentialist
arguments: what is the common denominator
which makes diverse societies Muslim beyond
the obvious fact of religion? Perhaps a good
way of answering this question is by drawing
parallels with European Christianity. The Chris-
tian world shares a universe of discourse refer-
ring to sets of institutions, doctrines and per-
sonnel: the church, the priesthood, the Holy
Trinity, the Bible, the problems of salvation and
grace. These are not restricted to the religious
sphere but have involved many spheres of cul-
ture, law, morality and family. Divorce, homo-
sexuality and abortion, for instance, continue
to be issues in the politics of several Western
countries. A good historian of Europe will tell
you however, that these entities of Church,
scriptures, law and so on, have taken vastly dif-
ferent forms and social significance at various
points in European history and in different
regions. The Medieval Catholic Church, for
instance, was a very different institution from
the eighteenth century Church and with a very
different role in society and politics.
Similarly, we find in Islam a common set of
vocabularies referring to institutions, doctrines
and personnel: the Qu'ran and Hadith (tradi-
tions of the Prophet), the ulama, the Sharica
(religious law) and many others. These have
similarly varying structures, forms of organiza-
tion and social significance over the centuries
and in different societies. Ernest Gellner in his
characterization of a constant pattern of Mus-
lim history and society, attributes a central role
to the ulama and the Sharica. His model, how-
ever, crumbles before the many different
forms of ulama organization, power, and insti-
tutions, not only in different societies and his-
tories but even within the class structure of the
same society. The elite ulama of late Ottoman
times, for instance, were integrated into the
ruling institutions and bureaucracies, while
their Iranian counterparts of the same time
constituted parts of local, decentralized power
elites with their own revenues and institutions
separate from the govenment. Both were dis-
tinct from the ulama ‘proletariat’ of their own
time, the multitude of students, preachers,
dervishes and mendicants, performing ser-
vices for the poor. Similarly, Sufism and sufi
brotherhoods, regular features of practically all
Muslim societies display a great variety of
manifestation and of relations to the main-
stream religious institutions, from elite intel-
lectual mystics counting the higher ulama in
their ranks, to illiterate rural charismatic saints
ruling peasant communities with magic, medi-
cine and ceremony.
And how do we understand these social for-
mations and their historical and geographical
variations and transformations, the logic of
their coherence and contradiction? Well, by
the same repertoire of social and historical
concepts and analyses which we use for West-
ern or any other societies. It is by these means
that we grasp the uniqueness of each manifes-
tation, not of a totalized history with an Islamic
e s s e n c e .
Finally, does the current ‘Islamic resurgence’
vindicate the essentialist position that Islam
remains the essence of Muslim society, which
is peculiarly resistant to secularization and to
separating religion from politics? I am more
convinced by the opposite argument: that cur-
rent political Islam is partly a reaction and a
defence against the secularizing processes
that have inevitably come with modernity and
which continue to have their effect on all soci-
eties in the region. Law, even where elements
of religion have remained within it, has
become codified state law, subject to political
and social exigencies; education has been
largely removed from religious spheres and
authorities (that is why these authorities are
trying, in vain, to hang on); religious authori-
ties cannot, try as they may, control the mani-
fold channels of information and entertain-
ment of the modern media; modern economic
exigencies have forced women into the labour
market and the public spheres, subverting
patriarchal authority and traditional values
(associated with religion). Only in a society so
thoroughly destroyed by successive wars such
as Afghanistan can the religious reactionaries
succeed in reversing these inexorable process-
es. Saudi Arabia, where wealth from petrol has
partly exempted the authorities from the exi-
gencies of modern socio-economic processes,
has also partly succeeded in arresting these
trends, but for how long? In Iran, the ‘mullocra-
cy’ of the Islamic Republic has had to retreat
repeatedly (but discreetly) in the face of these
contingencies. Family planning, for instance,
initially denounced by Khomeini as contrary to
Islam and an imperialist measure against Mus-
lims, was restored after a few years as govern-
ment policy. Family law, after initial reversals,
has now restored most of the Shah’s reforms
and more. Regarding working women, the
level of employment in the work force was
mostly maintained, and there is increasing par-
ticipation of women in public life, politics, the
arts, sport and even as junior judges. Crucially,
Khomeini, faced with the exigencies of gover-
nance, ruled in 1988 that in the interests of the
whole Islamic Umma, the Islamic government
is empowered to suspend any provision of the
S h a r ica, including prayer and fasting! Since
then the category of ‘interest’ (m a s l a h a) has
been written into the constitution and institu-
tionalized, opening the gates wide for prag-
matic legislation and policy. I rest my case. ♦
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It is often claimed that Islam is not only a religion but a
culture and a civilization. ‘The Islamic world’ and ‘Islam-
ic history’ are commonly used terms, both in popular
public discourse and in academic writing, suggesting
some kind of coherent unity. At the same time, writers
point to the diversity of Muslim countries from Morocco
to Indonesia, from Nigeria to Turkey. Is there a unity
behind the diversity, at least in the ‘heartlands’ of Islam
in the Middle East and North Africa, as Ernest Gellner
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